The developers of the Castello Token Contract contracted byterocket to conduct a smart contract audit of their token contract. The contract features an upgradeable ERC20 contract for mainnet, together with an upgradeable Polygon version of their token that directly integrates with the official bridge between Polygon and Ethereum.
Castello aims to “revolutionize the cryptocurrency market and combine the worlds of artistry and blockchain technology via a blockchain, digitizing the funding process for a world-class artwork as well as its future use cases”.
The team of byterocket reviewed and audited the above smart contracts in the course of this audit. We started on the 3rd and finished on the 7th of January 2022.
The audit included the following services:
byterocket gained access to the code via their private Github Repository. We based the audit on the master branch’s state on December 1st, 2021 (commit hash 30dd2466dec57bc506ba590717e3804b32405371).
We conducted a manual multi-pass code review of the smart contracts mentioned in section (1). Three different people went through the smart contract independently and compared their results in multiple concluding discussions.
These contracts are written according to the latest standards used within the Ethereum community and the Solidity community’s best practices. The naming of variables is very logical and understandable, which results in the contract being useful to understand. The code is very well documented and up to the latest standards.
The developers included all of the relevant scripts and tests, which allowed us to run through all of the processes.
On the code level, we found no bugs or flaws. A further check with multiple automated reviewing tools (MythX, Slither, Manticore, and different fuzzing tools) did not find any additional bugs.
Part of our audits are also analyses of the protocol and its logic. A team of three auditors went through the implementation and documentation of the implemented protocol.
We went through all of the provided documentation, tests, and contracts in a very detailed manner. The general description of the protocol is very well made, it’s very easy to understand how each function is supposed to work and what it implements.
We were not able to discover any problems in the protocol implemented in the smart contract.
This contract implements an ERC20 token, based on the upgradeable standard by OpenZeppelin. The contract as well as the included AccessControl package is properly initialized. The deployer will become the admin of the contracts as well as receive the initial supply of the token. The token has 8 decimals.
The developers also included a recommended 50-slot storage gap for future upgrades to the storage layout.
The polygon version of the token properly implements the required functionalities which are needed to work with the official PoS bridge between Ethereum and Polygon. The contract from (3.1) is imported and only extended by the two functions deposit() and withdraw(). The deposit() function can only be called by the “child chain manager” (which is correctly set to "0xA6FA4fB5f76172d178d61B04b0ecd319C5d 1C0aa”), in case a user has deposited tokens on the Ethereum mainnet with the intent to transfer them to the Polygon chain. The withdraw() function can be called by any token holder on Polygon intending to transfer their tokens back to Ethereum mainnet.
These corresponding functions are minting or burning the tokens on the Polygon chain.
Again, the developers included a recommended 50-slot storage gap for future upgrades to the storage layout.
During our code review (which was done manually and automated), we found no bugs or flaws. Our automated systems and review tools also did not find any additional ones.
The protocol review and analysis did neither uncover any game-theoretical nature problems nor any other functions prone to abuse.
During our multiple deployments to various local testnets, we haven’t been able to find any problems or unforeseen issues.
In general, we are delighted with the overall quality of the code and its documentation.
As of the date of publication, the information provided in this report reflects the presently held understanding of the auditor’s knowledge of security patterns as they relate to the client’s contract(s), assuming that blockchain technologies, in particular, will continue to undergo frequent and ongoing development and therefore introduce unknown technical risks and flaws. The scope of the audit presented here is limited to the issues identified in the preliminary section and discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. The audit report does not address or provide opinions on any security aspects of the Solidity compiler, the tools used in the development of the contracts or the blockchain technologies themselves, or any issues not specifically addressed in this audit report.
The audit report makes no statements or warranties about the utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, the legal framework for the business model, or any other statements about the suitability of the contracts for a particular purpose, or their bug-free status.
To the full extent permissible by applicable law, the auditors disclaim all warranties, express or implied. The information in this report is provided “as is” without warranty, representation, or guarantee of any kind, including the accuracy of the information provided. The auditors hereby disclaim, and each client or user of this audit report hereby waives, releases and holds all auditors harmless from, any and all liability, damage, expense, or harm (actual, threatened, or claimed) from such use.
We store our public audit reports on IPFS; a peer-to-peer network called the "Inter Planetary File System". This allows us to store our reports in a distributed network instead of just a single server, so even if our website is down, every report is still available.
The IPFS Hash, a unique identifier of the report, is signed on-chain by both the client and us to prove that both sides have approved this audit report. This signing mechanism allows users to verify that neither side has faked or tampered with the audit.
